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ABSTRACT 
This paper predicts  ex—ante  the  probability  of  currency  crises  end  size  of 
expected devaluations  month  by  month  for  Mexico between  1980  and  1986 
using  a heterodox  linear  discrete  time model  of exchange  rate  crises.  The 
forces  contributing to  speculative  attacks  on  the Mexican peso  include  internal 
money  creation,  external  credit  shocks, and  relative  price shocks. The 
framework proves  highly  successful for  generating forecasts  of  the probability 
of  speculative attacks  on  the  peso  and for  predicting lower  bounds for  post— 
collapse exchange  rates  using a  range  of  assumptions  about critical  levels of 
central  bank  reserve floors. Simulation results  suggest that reducing domestic 
credit growth, increasing the uocertainty  surrounding this growth, and reducing 
the  size  and perhaps  increasing the  frequency of  currency realignments might 
have greatly  reduced  the amount  of  currency speculation against  the peso in 
some of the crisis periods between 1980  and  1986. 
Linda S.  Goldberg 
New  York University  and NBER 
Department  of  Economics 
269 Mercer  Street 
New  York,  NY 10003 Introduction1 
The  theory  of  exchange rate  crises  has received considerable attention in recent  years2 
because of both the legacy  of the debt  crisis of  the  early  1980s and the sharp  exchange 
rate  realignments of the mid  1980s.  Though there has  been  no shortage  of  actual  crises, 
very few attempts have  been  made at applying and  testing crisis models. In this paper a 
discrete  time  model  of a collapsing  exchange regime is  applied  to the experiences of 
Mexico,  1980 to  1986.  The model  is  used to  assess the probability  that  the existing 
controlled exchange  rate will  be  collapsed  by a speculative attack  on central bank foreign 
exchange reserves.  It  also is  used to  generate forecasts  of  lower  bounds for sustainable 
post—collapse  exchange  rates. 
An exchange rate  crisis can take the form of  either a discrete devaluation  of a 
controlled  exchange  rate or a switch to  a floating rate accompanied by  a  sharp 
speculative attack  on central bank  holding  of  foreign  exchange reserves. The  dynamics of 
the  collapse  as  rooted  in  domestic  money  market equilibrium when  there is excess 
domestic credit  creation,  money  market  equilibrium can  be  achieved through  offsetting 
reductions  in  central bank  foreign  exchange reserves or by  exchange rate  adjustment 
Flood and Garber  (1984)1.  Under  a fixed  (or controlled) rate  regime, as  long  as foreign 
exchange  reserves remain  in  positive supply, monetary authorities can  succeed  at 
sustaining  the  exchange  rate  through  the purchase  of domestic  currency  and  sale of 
foreign  exchange  reserves, If speculators perceive  that  an  attack  on  central  bank  reserves 
can force  the exchange rate  to  be  devalued and the exchange regime abandonned,  they 
1An earlier version  of this paper  benefited  from the  helpful  comments of Peter  Kenen, 
Bill  Branson, and seminar participants at New  York  University and Columbia University. 
The C.V. Starr  Center  of NYU  is  gratefully  acknowledged  for its support. George 
Kyriacou  and  Shirley  Wang  provided  valuable research assistance. 
2For  example, see Krugman  (1979),  Flood and Carber  (1984),  Obstfeld  (1984),  Flood and 
Hodrick  (1985),  Buiter  (1987), Grilli (1986), and  Goldberg  (1988). 
—2— will  deplete reserves by  their  attack, eliminate the central  bank's  ability  tn  defend  the 
overvalued currency and  force  the  realignment. Models of collapse endogenously  predict 
the timing and probability of speculative attacks and forecast lower  bounds for the post- 
collapse  exchange  rates. 
The potential of this  line  of research  has  already been  demonstrated. For 
exacople, van  Wijnbergen  (1987)  shows  that  the  sustainability of the  move from  a 
fiexibie to a fixed exchange rate  as  undertaken in Brazil,  Israel and  Argentina with  the 
iotent  of  controlling runaway inflation can  be  severeiy  limited by  the pursuit of 
inconeistent  monetary  and fiscal  policies.  Blanco  and  Garber'  s  (1986) application of a 
coliaoee model  to  the  Mexican  experience  [1973 to  1982  illustrated the  predictive 
potential of these models concluding that  "devaluations, both  in and  out  of sample,  did 
occur  when the conditional exchange  rate  eet  by  the central  hank's policy  rule  exceeded 
the fixed  exchange  rate...  Furthermore, the  expected  exchange rates  conditional  on 
devaluation  are  close  to  the values  that  actually  materialized  in  the major episodes." 
Gumby  and van  Wijnhergen's  (1988)  application of  a similar  model  to the crawling peg 
experience  of  Argentina  [1979  and  1981[  led  them to conclude that  the  domestic credit 
growth  strategy  pursued by  the Argentine government nearly conp1eteiy undermined the 
announced crawling exchange rates. 
While these studies provide evidence  for the  qualitative and intuitive  success  of 
applying these linear discrete time models,  the  results can  be  improved  upon and 
broadened  in  a  number  of dimensions.  Restrictive  assumptions  prevailing  in  previous 
studies  include  strict  purchasing—power—parity (PPP),  interest rate  parity, and  the 
unresponsiveness of  the demand  for  real  balances to  currency substitution motives.  In 
addition, a richer specification of the  forces  contributing to crises can he  modelled. While 
domestic credit  shocks  are  still  expected to  be  the  dominant force  in  triggering 
—3-- speculative  attacks on a currency,  the Goldberg modification  of Flood  and  Garber  is 
applied  in this paper to  also track the significance  of  external credit  shocks  and relative 
price  shocks.  It  is shown  that the  relative price shocks  played an important  in role in 
the dynamics of the peso crises This is  not  the case for external  credit shocks in the 
1980s. 
The remainder  of the  paper is  organized  as  follows. Section  I describes the 
extended  collapse  model.  Section  II provides  a summary  of the  currency  history  for 
Mexico in  the  1980s.  Section  III  presents  the procedures  used  for data  analysis  and 
describes  the  iterative  estimation procedure  used  for  generating month—by—month 
predictions of post—collapse  exchange  rates and collapse probabilities  for  Mexico.  Section 
IV  provides out—of—sample  estimates of predicted shadow exchange rates and  collapse 
probabilities under a range of assumptions, including  structural  breaks in  money  demand 
behavior.  Out—of—sample  forecasts  are  compared with  those  generated by  Blanco and 
Garber  for  a  subperiod  of our study.  Section  V  analyzes  the forces contributing to 
Mexico's  crises and provides simulations of crises  under  different  patterns of  shocks  to 
the Mexican economy.  Section  VI concludes. 
1.  The Extended  Collapse  Model 
The discrete—time model  relies  on  a  money  market equilibrium condition which 
determines either the equilibrium exchange  rate  under  a flexible exchange  system  or  the 
endogenous path  of central  bank  reserves under  a controlled rate system? The  demand 
for  real  money  balances is  elastic with  respect  to  nominal interest rates [ij, domestic 
real income  [yj,  and the desire to substitute  domestic currency for foreign  currency when 
there  is  some expectation of a change  in the nominal exchange  rate,  St. 
3The model  presented in this  section  is an extended version  of Flood and Garber  (1984). 
Results are  discussed  in depth in  Goldberg  (1988). 
—4— M/Q,  =  a,  — 
a51,  -- a.y 
—  aE,jS1:c 
—  S,iS  (1; 
Rational  forecasts of exchange care  changes  ace  caicuiated  asing available  curcent and 
past  information  summacised by  5,.  the  pcice  deflator  on  nominai  money  balances, 
cnntains  both  traded  and  nontraded  goods prices,  F,  and F5,, weighted  by  a,,  the 
share  of domestic  goods in expenditure, 
Qc  =  a,P  (1_aJS,P*.  (2) 
Domestic  and  foreign goods prices  diverge  dnc  to  p  ,  medium  term systematic  PPP 
',iolations.t and t2, short  tecm  shocks  to relative  prices. 
P/S  p m t  (3) 
Generalized efflciency between domestic and foteign  asset  is  reflected in the  retncn eptead 
and the risk preminni  an  domestic assets. 
I,  =  i0 
—  E,jS,1:5. 
—  S /°  -t-  r,  (4) 
The  snppy  of money  na  two  cnmponcntc  tFe  stock of  centcal bank  fneign 
exchange reserves  [Rb'  and the  stock of  domestic credEt  DJ. 
M,=  R±D5  (3) 
Domestic  credit creation  (and  domestic  spending excesses)  are  viewed  as  the  primaty 
reason  for reserve  depletion and  an  eventual exchange  regime collapse.  Thus,  the 
domestic  credit  component of the  money  supply  is  modelled  as evoIing  according  to  a 
trend rate that reflects the mean  basic  deficit  fpl. 
D,  =  D,± t± Ct  (6) 
The  shocks to  domestic  credit  creation  are  generally  treated  as  random  disturbances 
analytically  similar to a first  order  process  dciving  domestic  credit  creation  [Blanco  and 
Garber  (1986)]. Cumby and  van  Wijnbergen (1988) interpret  domestic credit  expansion as 
4This wedge  also could  be  sensitive to  expected  exchange  rate  changes  ]  Gonnolly and 
Taylor  (1984)  and Flood  and Hodrick  (1985) 
—5— mirroring  trend fiscal  deficits, ,., subject  to random  disturbances  €.  However,  these 
disturbances  may  be  decomposed  by  source:  i)  random revenue or expenditure affecting 
the need  to monetize government deficits  -y,j;  and ii) random  and constrained access to 
external  credit that  makes uncertain  the share  of  government deficits to be financed  by 
external borrowing J  instead of  inflationary finance.5  By  construction  and  are the 
orthogonal components of these net revenue and external  credit  shocks. 
cc =  —  (7) 
If,  in  any period, expansion  of domestic credit  is  too  large to  be  absorbed by  the 
demand for real balances, equilibrium in the money  market 
=  Md  (8) 
is restored by adjustment  of the  exchange  rate  in a flexible rate  system or by  offsetting 
movements of  the central  bank  reserve stock  under a controlled rate  system. Prolonged 
difficulties for  the central  bank  arise when this depletion of foreign exchange reserves is 
the  outcome  of fundamental disequilibrium (systematic overvaluation) rather than 
transitory  events. The resulting systematic decline of  reserves may  lead  economic  agents 
to doubt the ability of the  central  bank  to sustain  the  controlled  rate.  Agents  may 
initiate  speculative attacks on  the  currency which can  fulfil  their own expectations  by 
collapsing the  exchange  rate  lObstfeld (1986)1. 
The  ahadow  exchange  rate,  S÷1,  defines  the exchange rate that  would 
equilibrate  the money  market  in  t+1  if a speculative attack were to  drive reserves  to 
their  minimal  level  and  force  the  collapse  of the  controlled  exchange  rate.  Under 
domestic  currency convertibility,  if  agents  are  cumulatively  powerful  enough  to  deplete 
existing  stock  of  central  bank  foreign exchange reserves, speculators will  attack reserves 
5The treatment of this  second  source  of shock alternatively can be  interpreted as 
randomizing the  level  of net central  bank reserve  floors. 
—6— at the moment  such behavior is  expected  to yield profits. By equations 1  through  8,  the 
period  t+1 shadow exchange  rate  is  derived as: 
t+=  {1/at+i{p*t+i±at+i(ot÷i+pt,i)}{(a.+a3+at+i)/at+j}pt+i+  D+ R0+(7÷l—t÷1)} (9) 
Relative  price shocks,  if positive,  put downward  pressure  on the  exchange rate  by 
increasing real  money demand  for  transactions  purposes.  Internal  government  basic budget 
shocks,  increase  devaluation pressure  by  increasing  the  amount  of fiscal  monetizing. 
External credit  supply shocks,  if positive, decrease  the pressure on the exchange rate by 
reducing the  need  for domestic credit creation. 
The conventional approach is  to  define  ir,  the  probability of a  (successful) 
speculative attack  in  the  beginning  of t+1  as  assessed  in  period  t,  as analogous  to  the 
probability  that  the  expected post—attack exchange rate  will  exceed  the  controlled exchange 
rate:e 
—  Prj 
—  > 0  1  (10) 
where  equals E, when the exchange  rate  is fixed, or equals some other  preannounced or 
bounded  level  if the exchange  rate follows  a crawling peg.  By rearranging terms to group all 
random  components to the right—hand side of the bracketed  expression,  and  all 
'fundamental'  variables  to the  left  hand  side,  the  conditional  probability  of speculative 
attack  or collapse is: 
= Pr {  < K1 }  (11) 
where  K÷1=  ((a÷1± a1+a3)/a÷1)p41 + D+ R÷1 _Sia±i[P*t+i+ ÷1÷j} 
and  at÷i=  a0  + a2y1 
—  a1lit÷1 + r+j 
K±1 contains those variables which  can  be forecast with relatively  high  accuracy.7  To  derive 
a closed form  solution for  (11),  the random  terms,  and U, are assumed to  be 
eGoldberg (1989)  offers a broader interpretation of the probability of collapse in the 
context of a  heterogeneous  agent model. 
71n  the  empirical  application the risk premium is treated  as  subsumed by the constant. 
—7— distributed  as displaced exponentials with zero means  and variances of (1/A1)2,  (1/A2)2  and 
(1/w)2, respectively.  The solution to system (11)  is: 
=  [wA2/[1÷1a1÷1a1+1(A1+A2)(w+A1)1[exp[  A1K'  ,  where  (12) 
K'  ={[(a÷1+a1+a3)/a÷1J1j÷1  +D1  +R—i/A1--t-1/A2 
—  St+iat+i(P*t+i± 01+1p1+1 
This  result  states that  the probability  of a speculative attack  on  foreign currency  reserves 
depends on agents'  forecasts  of  the evolution of a range of economic  variables which include 
domestic  credit  growth,  the  systematic  overvaluation  of  domestic goods  (pt+i'  0),  and  the 
possible magitudes of internally and externally generated  economic  shocks. 
II.  The Mexican Experience 
The events surrounding the Mexican crises  of the  1980s  are  by  now familiar. Following a  long 
period  of exchange stability  and  conservative monetary policy,  The abundance  of 
petrodollars in the late  1970s  helped  the stability of the reigning  highly controlled float.  This 
remained  in place until  early  1981  when  a swifter rate of currency depreciation against  the 
dollar  [8  to  10  percent  per  month[  was announced along  with  a promise of  no  major sharp 
adjustments.  Soon  afterwards,  currency  speculation  rose,  capital  flight  increased,  and  vast 
amounts of money  were  shifted  into investments and real estate in the United  States.  In  early 
1982  new  credit  flows  to  Mexico  levelled,  marking the end  of  the  rapid  expansion  of  private 
and  official  commitments Mexico.  The Mexican government  was  able to  defend  the exchange 
rate  until  February 1982 when  the  government  withdrew  support  of the peso  in foreign 
exchange markets.  The  exchange  rate regime  collapsed  into  a temporary float  and  the  peso 
depreciated  by  67.7  percent.  Though July  1982  may  be  considered the start of  Mexico's 
81f shocks  were  assumed to  be  normally distributed,  rather than  exponentially distributed, 
the probability density function for the combined random variables would  not  be  nearly 
as tractable.  The  solution  would  be 
ir(t)=Jt1) f  (X—Z) 2/2o]dXdZ.  The exponential distribution is  also  intuitively appealing since it highlights the potential 
for large  one—sid3ed expansions  of domestic credit while ruling out the unlikely 
corresponding contractions which appear  under  the normal distribution 
—8— rationed  access  to external  credit,  patterns  of total debt  service  and  totai new  commitments 
show that new  loans directed at sustaining the  fixed  rate  were scarce  as  early  as  1980.  Total 
debt  service exceeded total  new  commitments by  steadily rising amounts  between  1980  and 
1985.  Between 1982 and 1983  new credit to  Mexico fell  by approximately 40 percent.9 
Triggered by  the  onset of the Mexican debt  crisis,  in August  1982  the government 
again succumbed to market  speculation and withdrew support  for  the peso.  The collapse led 
to a temporary  closing  of all  foreign  exchange  markets  and the implementation of a two tier 
exchange  system. 
The two  tier system was  replaced by  a crawling peg  in September 1983.  The  crawl 
provided  for daily peso depreciations at a rate of 13  centavos to the dollar. In  December 1984 
the slippage rate  was increased  to  17  centavos per dollar per day. In  March 1985  the slippage 
rate  increased  once  again,  this  time  to  21  ceotavos per day.  This crawl remained  until  July 
1985  when the government devalued the  controlled rate  by  16.7  perceot, before abandonniog 
the crawling rate altogether in August  1985  in favor  of a controlled float. The controlled float 
was intended  to provide  for daily  adjustments  of the exchange rate  to  compensate for the 
inflation differential between the United States  and  Mexico.  In  practice, the exchange regime 
was similar to the crawling peg  which  preceded it. 
Based  on  this credit  and  currency history,  the  collapse  model  for fixed  or  crawling 
rate systems is most  appropriately applied to  the  1980  to  1986  period  for Mexico.  Although 
Mexico's externally credit constrained  interval begins  in  1980 and the  tightly controlled 
exchange regime  formally ends in August  1985,  results are generated for various  subperiods of 
the full sample.  The results  for  1980:12  through  1982:9  overlap with  the  interval  studied  by 
Blanco  and Garber using quarterly data 11980:IV—1982:IIII. 
5As  measured by asset positions of banks and offshore  institutions reporting to the Bank 
for International Settlements 
—9— HI.  Data Analysis and  Estimation:  The  first  step  in  applying  the  crisis  model  to  the 
Mexican  experience entails generating  one—period ahead  forecasts  of t+1 dated  variables 
j+1,  P*  y1J. A second order  autoregressive and  moving average 
process is applied over rolling 18 month intervals to provide these ex—ante  forecasts. 
Among the  most  important  elements of the collapse models are the trend  behavior 
of domestic  credit  and its  randomness.  After  generating  forecasts,  a residual  series 
is  constructed. This series  is  used  for  decomposing  domestic credit 
prediction  errors by  source,  either:  1)  domestic  monetary  and  fiscal authorities  (internally 
generated shocks); or ii)  foreign  creditors (externally generated shocks).  Using  rolling 
regression  over ex—post data for the  18  quarters prior  to each  period  t,  the  portion  of 
domestic credit shocks  attributable  to  the  behavior of external creditors is  isolated by 
regressing  against ex—post  externally supplied credit, F. This generates an  estimate  of the 
component of domestic credit  shocks  linked  in  any  way  to  the  change in the supply  of  net 
external  credit  to  Mexico.  It  is interpreted  as  the  externally induced shock and  is  formally 
written  as  =  The remaining portion of domestic  credit  shocks  is interpreted  as 
that directly  induced  by  domestic  authorities: by  construction these are  the  orthogonal 
residuals, 1c  =  —  Rolling  samples  of  and  y are  analyzed  to  generate the 
distributions  of expected externally and  internally  generated  shocks  to domestic credit.  The 
standard deviation  of the data for  18  months,  inclusive of  t,  is taken  to be the period 
forecast of  the  standard  deviation of shocks  expected  in  t±1,  and 
Domestically induced credit  variability  generally increased gradually  throughout  the  sample 
with  the  exception  of  step  increases  in  early  and  mid—1982, late  1983, and  mid—1984. 
Externally induced credit  variability  increased  sharply in  mid— 1982,  at  the  time of the debt 
crisis,  and  began  to subside in  early  1984  before sharply  and continually rising in  the latter 
part of 1984,  and again in  late  1985. 
—10— This  method  of  decomposition  presents an interesting bias  to  the estimation  results. 
If the correlation between foreign credit  contractions and domestic expansions is  positive,  the 
random  behavior  of  domestic  monetary  authorities  is biased  downward.  Since the  positive 
correlation is extremely  likely,  this implies an implicit  upward bias  on  the  role  of external 
credit  shocks  in Mexico's  currency crises.  Alternatively stated,  this  approach may  understate 
the  role  of domestic monetary authorities  since  it conservatively estimating  their  contribution 
to the forces which trigger speculation and  lead  to the collapse of  an  exchange  rate  system. Tf 
the  results still  suggest the overwhelming importance of  uncertainty  attributable to domestic 
monetary authorities,  arguments which shift the emphasis to the actions  of external creditors 
would not be  highly credible. 
The scale of domestic  credit uncertainty  surrounding  domestic credit policies of 
monetary authorities  grew  fairly steadily between 1980 and  1987,  Marked increases  in 
uncertainty  levels  are evident in early  1982,  prior  to the poignant currency and debt  crises  of 
the  1982/1983  period,  and  in early 1985 prior  to  the  abandonment  of the crawling  psg 
regime. Uncertainty surrounding external  credit  flows  was fairly  stable at low levels through 
June  of 1982.  At  the time of the debt  crisis and the  temporary closing of Mexico's  foreign 
exchange market  in August  1982,  uncertainty  surrounding  foreign credit  flows  substantially 
rose and  remained at  new  high levels through  early  1984.  A  substantial  rise  in  the 
uncertainty  surrounding external credit  flows  to  Mexico  occured throughout  the remainder of 
1984  and  peaked1°  in February  1986.  A highly controlled  float was  in  effect  at that point. 
15The peak  described is  local  since  the uncertainty surrounding external credit  flows 
declined sharply in  1986  and' early 1987  before  reaching  new  highs in mid  1987  and  1988. 
—11— To  capture  the  role  of  departures from  purchasing power parity  (PPP) during  crisis 
periods,11 patterns  of  deviations  from  PPP, P—S1P, are decomposed  into the  sum  of 
systematic (predictable using period t—1  information) and random components, 1p and 
Pt/st_P.1 
—  + a  (13) 
The predictable  component is  used  to generate  forecasts  of  expected future  deviations  from 
1p1÷1,  and  the  residual relative  price  shocks.  As  in  the  case  of  monetary  shocks, the 
expected  future  distribution  of relative price shocks  can  be  parameterized to yield a forecast 
of  the expected  standard deviation of relative  price  shocks,  1/w1,1.12  Evolution  of the 
random component of  purchasing power  parity deviations is illustrated by the  plot  of  1/1w÷1 
in Figure 3.  Prior to the February  1982  steep devaluation of the peso, the markets  perceived 
relatively  low  levels of risk  associated  with relative  price  movements.  Due  to  the  sharp 
realignments in  1982,  the risk  associated with relative  prices  soared, peaking in mid  1982  but 
remaining  at exceptionally  high levels through 1984.  A  period  of relative  price stability 
occured  during the  crawling rate  interval  between  mid—1984 and  mid—1985. With  the 
abandonment of the  crawl  in  favor of a controlled float  in  late  1985,  relative price 
uncertainty increased  substantially but  by no  means  approached the  levels of the  1982 
through early  1984 interval. 
R1+1  also  must be specified  before the  system  is  estimated.  While the  lowest 
levels of reserves that the central  bank will  tolerate  at any  time t  may be  known  by  central 
bankers, these values are unavailable publicly until  the regime  collapses.13  Blanco  and Garber 
'1Previous empirical studies of crises  did not fully  capture  these forces leading  to 
estimation  biases.  While Blanco  and Garber allowed  for random deviations from 
purchasing power parity,  Cumby  and van Wijnbergen considered  neither systematic or 
random departures  from  purchasing power  parity. 
12Using the criterion of out—of—sample  predictive performance, an  ARMA procedure 
predicted relative price gaps with systematically smaller  forecast errors than  richer 
alternative approaches applied. 
3Efforts  by  Goldberg (1988)  to pin down patterns  in R using  cross country analyses 
revealed only  that the level  is  inversely  related to  access  to international  liquidity. 
—12— modelled  the reserve floor  as a constant multiplied by  ao index of U.S.  import  prices.  Cumby 
and vao  Wijnbergen assumed the  reserve  floor  was  described by a uniform distribution with 
an  upper  bound  as  the current  level  of  reserves and  the  lower  bound  as  minus the central 
hank's gross  foreign  liabilities.  While  both are reasonable approaches to this  illusive  statistic, 
a conservative  test  of  the  out—of—sample  predictive  performance of this  model  frames  the 
choice  of an ad hoc specification  over the  use of ex—post  information.  To  highlight  the 
importance of the  reserve  floor  specification  for the results,  all  estimation results are 
conducted separately  for a range  of  reserve  floors between R,=—$200 million and Si  billion 
1977  US dollars.  The negative  reserve  floors  are  included  to  capture  the  perception that  the 
central  bank  may  have had  access  to  emergency  lines  of  credit  for  the purpose to  defending 
the currency.  Real reserve finors are  translated  from dollars  into  nominal domestic currency 
(billions  of pesos) using the official  exchange  rats and the Mexican consumer  price index. 
iterative  Estimation of Money  Market Ecuilibrium 
The next  step  in estimating  the  collapse model  is  to estimate money demand  parameters. 
Since one  of  the right hand  side  variables,  the expected change  in the exchange rate,  is  a 
nonlinear  function of money  demand parameters  a multi—stage iterative estimation  procedure 
is  applied to equations Ii to 15  drawn from the  model  of Section II. 
M/Q=  a0—  a1i± a2y— a3{[  l—1r ][Sa÷1_Sj/S±  (ii) 
a.1=a0-i-  a2 5y+1 —a1  (12) 
+=  (a1+a3+a÷1)/a2+1}  + D  t+1}  (13) 
t÷11/tAl. tt1+1/z, 
+—  (14) 
= [1w1÷1  0A2  1a1l  ++ t12  . t+1)  b11 ÷)]  )Iexp[A1  I  (IS) 
—13— Step  1:  Start—up values of a3,  a1,  and  a2  are generated by estimating  the  money  market 
equilibrium  condition,  omitting the  currency  substitution term. This system  is  roughly 
comparable in structure  to those  of  previous studies, except  that those studies omitted  the 
currency substitution term. 
Step 2: The first—pass  values of the  parameters  and  the start—up value for  parameter  a3 
are input  into equations 12  through  15  to generate first  pass—estimates  of the  post—collapse 
shadow rate  and  the collapse probability.14  In  this step  the information on the composition 
and distribution of shocks  and data forecasts are utilized. 
Step  3:  The money  market equilibrium  condition  is  reestimated  using  shadow  rate and 
probability estimates from the previous pass.  New  parameter estimates are generated, 
Step  4:  New  parameter estimates are  used  in equations  12  through 15  to  generate  new 
estimates of  the post—collapse  shadow rate  and the  collapse  probability. 
Steps 4  and  5  are repeated until  convergence,  where convergence  is defined as the 
attainment of local  maximum within a finite number of passes through the dataJ5 
IV.  Estimation Results 
The  model  is estimated using  a  range  of  assumptions  over  parameter stability within 
intervals  and  a  range of reserve floors.  While the  full  sample  of  data spans 1980:12  to 
14S(t+1)  is  the announced one—period  ahead exchange  rate.  The final results are locally 
independent of the  choice  of start up  value  for a3. 
151n practice,  the system  generally  is estimated for up to  15  passes through the data. 
Although  the parameter estimates converged  to stable  values  in most runs,  it is unknown 
whether the final values represented  local or global  maxima. Other estimation issues  arise 
because the generated first  pass estimates of a3,  a1  and a2  are subject to omitted 
variables bias to the extent that  the  expected  change  in the exchange  rate is correlated 
with the interest  rate  and  income.  This bias reduces to a function of the covariance of 
nominal domestic credit with nominal interest  rates and real income  respectively. While 
the  convergence  results suggest  that this omitted variables bias disappears, it is  unclear  if 
there is any residual effect  on  final parameter estimates. 
—14— 1986:12,16 estimation  over  subihtervals  provides  evidence  that  money  demand  was  unstable 
over  this period. Below,  results are  presented  for the  pre—1983:10 and post  1983:9  periods. 
The  break point  is the time of implementation of the crawling peg regime.  In  the early 
interval,  money  demand  shows  a positive and significant income elasticity  of demand,  as 
expected.  The interest sensitivity and  currency  substitution motives  for money  demand 
holdings  are  both positive  and significant  in  this  early period,  with  the  sign  reversal 
contrary to expectations. In the post  1983:9 interval, the elasticity of money  demand to the 
interest rate was  the only significant term  in the  money- demand equation. 
For  the early interval,  the higher the reserve  floor  the higher the prediction of a 
currency  collapse.  The  one—period—ahead  collapse probability predictions  are shown  in 
Figure 5  for the range of reserve  floors [$—100  million  ,  $000 ,  $100  million,  $200  million, 
$300  million, and  $500  million in  1977  priced. 
While runs over the  different  coilapse probabilities all  behave  qualitatively similar, 
the  higher reserve floor  estimates,  as  expected, are associated with  higher predictions of 
collapse probabilities  and slightly  different shadow exchange rate forecasts since different 
money demand  parameter  estimates  are  used  in  generating the  forecasts.  Figures  5  and 6 
present  the estimates  of  one period ahead probabilities  of  collapse for a range  of  reserve 
floors and actual exchange rates alongside predicted  shadow  exchange rates for  the case 
R=$200 million (in  1977  prices). 
Collapse probabilities were  uniformly high  in November 1981,  but  the central  bank 
did not  experience a  level  of run which would  cause a currency collapse.  Since the model is 
of the behavior  of a representative  agent,  this  result would  imply  that  the  agents were 
confident  that  the central bank  had access to  external  credit which would  enable  it  to 
leWhile the sample estimated begins  in  1980:12,  the full sample of the data begins  in 
1977.  This data is not used in estimation since at least 36  months of observations are 
lost  due  to the  procedures  used for forecasting the various series. 
-  —15— withstand  speculation.  While skepticism  remained  high  for  many  types  of  agents,  using 
reserve floors  to approximate type,  the shadow exchange  rate  results suggest that the scale 
of devaluation was  underpredicted by  even  the  high  reserve  floor  model.  This steep 
devaluation convinced the  low  reserve  floor  agents  of  the short term sustainability  of  the 
peso, but  the  high  floor  agents  were  less  sanguine-  By  April  1982,  expansionary monetary 
policies  undermined the restored  confidence  in the  peso  leading  low reserve floor agents to 
predict  an  additional  4  percent devaluation and the  high  reserve floor  agents to predict  an 
additional  16 percent devaluation.  Central bank  foreign exchange reserves began  to fall 
dramatically,  although  they  were  not  instantaneously  depleted.  The shadow  rate results 
suggest that  the  predicted  devaluation  rose  steadily though  the course of the  speculative 
attack  on  central  bank  reserves in  the  months which followed,  The devaluation predictions 
rose  to the range  of  23  to  32  percent by  August  1982  at which time all  agents17  predicted 
the demise  of  the peso,  and again  to the range  of  36 and  45  percent  by  November.  The 
devaluation in December was  93  percent of the previous month's peso value. 
This major realignment temporarily satisfied  the more optimistic, low reserve  floor 
agents, but did  not  satiate the  more  critical, high  reserve  floor  agents who predicted that 
an additional  10  percent  devaluation would  be  needed  in January  1983.  This  implies  that, 
depending on  the composition  of  agents in the  economy,  the dual  exchange  rate initiated  at 
the start  of  1983  may  have  been  set at overvalued levels.  For  all reserve floor  simulations, 
the  prevailing  exchange rates soon  were  undermined by  the  quickened pace  of  domestic 
credit expansion and inflation. 
Interval estimates  strongly suggest  a structural  shift in  money  market  activity at 
around this period.  This is  not  surprising, given the  realization of the  magnitude of the 
debt  crisis,  the  implications  for  future  credit  flows  and  the  restructuring  of the  foreign 
t7All agents are those defined  by the range of  possible  view  of critical  reserve  floors. 
—16-- exchange  rate regime. While numerous estimates were conducted over  a range of subsampels 
of  the  full data set, the money demand estimates over  the full  sample 1980:12—1986:12 are 
meaningless because of the structural instability  and generally  are uninformative for the 
latter half of the sample.  Therefore,  below the  probability  of collapse figures represent 
probabilities generated for the  1983:10 to  1986:12 under the assumption that the parameters 
estimated for the early interval were still valid for the latter interval. 
The results  suggest  that the rate of crawl for the peso was inadequate at  least 
through August  1984.  The significant increase in  uncertainty  surrounding  money creation 
appears  to  have  dominated the ir,  jump  ohserved  in  December  1983.  The  subsequent 
contraction of domestic credit  in  January  1984  lowered  collapse expectations but  generally 
failed  to restore faith  in the sustainability of  the existing crawl. 
The sharp rise  in  domestic credit creation forecasts and  the  high  levels  of 
surrounding uncertainty contributed to  the  April  1984 predictions of  a more  steeply 
devalued peso.  As foreign exchange  reserves  fell  sharply  in that  period, some  measure  of 
confidence in the  peso  crawl  was  restored by  the  monetary  authorities  pulling  in  on  the 
reigns of domestic credit.  A full scale speculative  attack appears to  have  been  averted. For 
the remainder of 1984,  the peso followed  a rate  of  crawl which, according to the collapse 
estimates, was  sufficient to  minimize  currency speculation. The increase in the rate  of  crawl 
in  December  1984 was associated with an  interval of peso  strength  in  the  sense  of 
accumulating  foreign exchange reserves. The  increase in  uncertainty  surrounding external 
credit flows  appreared to  have  little  effect on shifting ir to critically  high  levels. Moreover, 
the  model  predicts  that collapse probabilities remained close  to zero  for the remainder of 
the sample.  This could suggest that  confidence  in the peso was  restored by  the  successful 
application of the crawl and the controlled float that followed.  However,  these  resolts  could 
also  reflect a problem with the application of the collapse model  to this latter interval. 
—17— Blanco  and  Gerber (1986)  had  modelled  speculation against the  peso  using 
quarterly data  for the  1973:IV  to  1982:111  interval,  a  single  reserve  floor  and  using  a more 
simplified  framework.  While that paper greatly  enriched  our  understanding of the potential 
of  such  models,  the  broader framework  developted  and  estimated  herein  provides  more 
plausible shadow  exchange rate  and  collapse probability  values and much greater  insight 
into the  forces  driving crises  in the overlapping interval. 
VI.  Decomposition of "Cause& of the Currency Crises:  Simulation Results 
In  this section,  the set of parameter values associated with  each reserve floor are  used in 
generating probability  and  shadow exchange rate  values  for a  range of scenarios. 
Specifically, the  pre  1983:10 interval estimations using  R values  ranging  from  —$100 
million to  $500 million  (in  1977  dollars) generated the  sets  of  parameter estimates 
presented in Table  1. 
Table 1:  Parameter  Values from  Runs using  Pre  1983:10 data,  by  Reserve  Floor 
Rc  —$100  0.00  $100  $200  $300  $500 
a3  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0000  0.000 
a1  —0.293  —0.285  —0.283  0.288  —0.273  —0.273 
a3  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.013  0.014 
a3  —1.670  —1.847  —1.875  —2.035  —2.100  —2.112 
* 
The constant  term was  insignificantly  different  from  zero  in all runs and is 
set equal to zero in simulations. All other  parameters are  highly  significant. 
These  sets of parameters  are  used  in simulations which generate the shadow exchange  rates 
and  collapse  probability estimates under  the assumption that  these  parameters values 
persisted and for eaeh of  the  exercizes  shown  in  Table 2.  The results generated are for the 
full sample 1980:12 to  1986:12. 
—18— Table 2:  Simulations Conducted Using  Early Interval Parameters,  by  Reserve  Floor 
1/A,  1/A2  17w 
0001.1/A1 
0.50 1/A1 
1.00  1/A1 
2.00  1/A1 
0.0011/A2 
050  1/A2 
1.00  1/A2 
2.00  1/A2 
0.0011/w 
0.50 .1/w 
1.00  1/w 
2.00  1/w 
O.O01l/p÷ 
0.50  .1/1p1 
1.00 
2.00  1/p 
Figures  7  through  10  show probability  rate  estimates  for a representative subset  of  these 
runs. The results shown are for the csse of R0=$100  million (1977  dollars). 
The first  striking  results  is  that increasing the variability  of  internally  generated 
shocks  generally  decreases rather than  increases  the  probability of a  speculative attack on 
the  peso.  (See Figure 7.)  Although  counter—intuitive,  Goldberg  (1989)  noted  that this 
theoretical possibility arise when  1/A11  is  sufficiently  large  so  that further  increases  in  the 
stochastic  behavior of domestic credit  decrease  the expectation  that  the shadow rate will 
exceed  the controlled rate  in the  following  period. Consider  the  role  of  these shocks  in  the 
1981:6 thrnugh  1983:9 interval.  If the variability  of internally generated shocks  were  halved, 
currency speculation  (if  positively related  to  ir1)  is predicted  to  have  been  even  higher in 
the periods preceding the February  1982 realignment and in early  1983.  The model  suggests 
that  doubling the uncertainty  surrounding  internal  credit  growth  could have reduced the 
probability  of the bollapse by  as much as  50  percent prior  to  February  1982  and could 
have  significantly reduced speculation in the months which followed. 
Decreasing the  variability  of external credit shocks,  on  the other hand, would 
have  reduced the  probability  of collapse, but  not  by  very  large  amounts.  A  reduction of 
1/A21  to one  thousandth  of  its  level  generally  reduced ir by  less  than  5  percent  in each 
period. This is a strong result. It suggests that  external credit  shocks  contributed  very  little 
to the currency  crises  of Mexico  in  the  1980s.  This  result  is strengthened  further  if une 
—19— considers that the  construction  of 1/Afl tended  to  overstate  rather  than  understate  its 
importance. 
The role of relative  price shocks  in  the  onset  of crises  varies over time. 
Decreasing  the variability  of relative prices  uniformly reduced the probability  of collapse. 
The significance of  this  effect dramatically  changed prior  to  and  following  the  February 
1982  realignment,  when  1/we  rose sharply.  Pre-  February  1982,  reducing  relative  price 
uncertainty  would  have  had  little  effect on  currency  speculation.  Following this  period, 
however,  1/we contributed greatly to speculation since, according to the model, agents were 
reluctant  to take  another sharp reduction in  the  purchasing power  of  their  holdings. This 
force  becomes even  stronger  as  the share of traded goods  in the  home consumption bundle 
rises.  While the  model  predicts  that  reducing 1/w,  sharply  in  the  periods  following  the 
realignment would  have dramatically cut the  speculation  through  July  1982,  following 
Mexico's  August  1982 announcements none  of  the agents modelled would  have  continued to 
hold  pesos even  if the expected variability of  relative prices  was  reduced to near zero. 
It should  be  noted, however,  that the  important  contribution  of  expected  relative 
price shocks  again  surfaces in  the  months  beginning  with December  1982  when  the 
government attempted  to bring the  peso  under control.  Consider the  lr,  estimates shown  in 
Table 3  and depicted in Figure 9. 
These simulation results  are  difficult  to interpret  since 1/wv  is  a function of  past 
surprise  devaluations.  However,  1/wv,  would  increase by  a  much smaller  amount  if there 
were  small  rather  than  large realignments to  the peso.  The results suggest  that the 
speculative attacks  against  the peso  might  have  been  reduced,  and  confidence  in  the peso 
restored in early  1983,  if the government  had  implemented a series  of small  realignments 
rather than the  67  percent  and  93  percent  devaluations  which occured  in  February  and 
November of  1982.  Of course,  the probability  of collapse nonetheless  rises again  in the 
—20— second  half of 1983  serving  as a reminder that  neither a fixed  rate  or  crawling peg system 
are sustainable in the presence  of other, inconsistent policy  actions. 
Table 3: Collapse Probabilities for Scaled  1/w Simulations, 1982:8 to  1983:12 
(for R0=$100 million  1977  dollars) 
Date  Collapse Probabilities 
(.0O11/w)  (O.50.1/w3  (1.0O'1/w) 
1982:10  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1982:11  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1982:12  0.012  0.127  1.000 
1983:1  0.004  0.819  1.000 
1983:2  0.008  0.078  1.000 
1983:3  0.010  0.108  1.000 
1983:4  0.007  0.079  1.000 
1983:5  0.007  0.076  1.000 
1983:6  0.005  0.059  1.000 
1983:7  0.032  0.365  1.000 
1983:8  0.032  0.484  1.000 
1983:9  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1983:10  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1983:11  1.000  1.000  1.000 
1983:12  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Finally, the  next  set  of simulations,  shown  in Figure 10,  derives  the  collapse 
probabilities under  the assumption  that  the forecast  growth  of domestic credit was either 
halved or doubled,  Collapse probabilities  were at  low  levels until  November 1981,  when 
domestic credit jumped dramatically.  By the construction of  the signal extraction problem, 
this  increased both  and  1/Afl.  f  were halved  in  1982  and  1983  (with  1[\, 
unchanged), the currency speculation may have  been  reduced,  but the dynamics of ,  would 
have been quite similar.  Yet, if both  and  1/X,  were halved, the  outcome would  be 
quite different since  1r is  decreasing in  1/1,. Reducing both  and 1/) by  50  percent 
leads  to higher collapse probabilities that are larger than  if actual  values were unchanged. 
—21— VI.  Concluding Remarks 
This application of a speculative attack  model  to  Mexico's experiences  in  the  1980s 
suggests that domestic  monetary  arid  fiscal policy  rather than  external credit  shocks  were 
the driving forces in  triggering speculative attacks  on  the Mexican peso  in  the  1980s.  The 
model  successfully  predicted the realignments of the peso  which occured in  this period, and 
generated probabilities  of  speculative attacks  that were  conditioned  on the  assumed  lower 
limit on central hank  foreign  exchange  reserve  holdings. The simulation results  suggest that 
reducing domestic  credit  growth,  increasing the  uncertainty  surrounding  this  growth,  and 
reducing the  size  and  perhaps increasing the  frequency  of  currency realignments may  have 
greatly reduced the amount  of  currency speculation against  the  peso  in  some of the  crisis 
periods  between 1980  and  1986. 
The results  also  suggest that  more  attention be focussed on the importance  of 
heterogeneous agents  for  the timing  and  magnitude of speculative attacks  on  a currency. 
Specifically,  it  is  shown  that  by  varying  the  assumed critical  reserve floor,  the  predicted 
shadow  rate and  collapse  probabilities  also  greatly  change.  While  the crisis  literature 
generally  models balance of payments crises using a representative  agent framework, these 
results suggest that if  different  agents are endowed with different perceptions about central 
bank  access  to  hquidity,  they  may  be  triggered  to  speculate against  the  peso at  distinct 
points in time. 
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D:  claims on  Mexican government by Bank of Mexico,  billions of pesos.  IFS  line 12a, 
SR:  foreign  assets of Bank of Mexico,  IFS  line 11. 
F:  Bank for International Settlements, net asset position vis—a—vis Mexico 
Mexico' bank deposit rate,  in  percent  per annum, IFS. 
i':  United States monthly  T—Bill  rate. 
P:  Consumer price index,  Mexico,  IFS. 
P :  United  States wholesale price index,  IFS. 
at:  Exports plus Imports divided by  GDP, IFS. 
y:  Mexico's  CDP, interpolated to monthly data using production patterns. 
S:  Domestic currency price of U.S.  dollars,  IFS. 
—23— BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Blanco,  H.  and  P.Carber,  "Recurrent Devaluation and Speculative Attacks  on the Mexican 
Peso",Joornal of Political Economy, (February 1986) 
Buiter,  W.,  "Borrowing to  Defend  the  Exchange  Rate  aod  the  Timing and  Magnitude of 
Speculative Attacks", Journal  of  Ir'ernahnnal  Economics,  vol.23,  no.3,4  (1987). 
Cucnby,  R.  and  S.  van  Wijnbergen,  "Fiscal  Policy  and  Specoiative Runs  on  the  Central 
Bank  Under  a  Crawting  Exchange  Rate  Regime  Argentina t979  1981",  Journal of 
international  Economics,  September 1988. 
Flood, R.  and  P.  Carber, "Coliapsing  Exchange Rart  RegThes.  Some Linear Examples", 
Joornal of International  Economics,  vol  16  (1984). 
Flood, R.  and  R.  Hodrick, "Reai  Aspects of  Exchange  Rate  Choice  with  Collapsing  Fixed 
Rates",  Journal of Ioternationai Economirc, vol.2,,  no.3  4  L986 
Goldberg,  L..  "Co.iapslng Exchange  Rad. Regimce  Shocks  and Biases", Nationa, Bureau of 
Economic  Research working paper  2702  (1988). 
'Heterogeneous  Agents aod  the  Collapse  of a Fixed  Rats Regime", 
CV. Starr  Discoss'.jn Paper  89  01  Nra York  Uniersity. 
,  c0JiJ)5flt  Exchange Ra'e  P rg ns° 
Investigation, Ph.D.Thesis, Princeton  Unversity,  Janaary  ssS8,. 
Grilli,  V.,  "Buying  and  Selling  Attacks  on  Exchange  Rate  Systems",  Journal  of 
international  Eron.omirs,  vol.20 (1986. 
Krugman,  P.,  "A  Modet  of Balance of Pay'nnte Crdcs",  Jo 'nal of Money  Crodi'  and 
Banking, vol.11, no.3 (August  1979),  311  325. 
Obstfeld, M.,  "Balance of  Payments Crises and Devaloation',  Journal of Money,  Credit sod 
Banking, vol.16, no.2 (May  1984). 
————————, "Rational  and Self  Fulfilling  Balance  ot  Payments Criaes,"  American 
Economic  Review  vol.76  (March  1986). 
van  Wijnbergen,  S.,  "Fiscal  Deficits,  Exchange Rate  Crises  and  Inflation",  The  Foerder 
Institute  for Economic  Research,  Tel  Aviv University,  Working  Paper no. 2—86 (1986). 
—24— 